By LCDR David Baranek, USN | May 1993

 

As one of the nation's most important strike aircraft, the F-111 has overcome a painful birth and vindicated the efforts of forward-thinking designers, dedicated managers, and brave aircrews. This statement refers, however, to the Air Force version of the swing-wing fighter. Many have probably forgotten the Navy's trials with the plane, which grabbed a fair share of attention from 1961 until 1968. Although the F-111B--as Navy variants were designated--seemed like it might single-handedly ruin carrier aviation, it can now be viewed as the seed for an outstanding carrier-based fighter and weapon system. 

      

In the late 1950s, the Navy was looking for a new "fleet air defense" (FAD) aircraft, initially conceived as simply a platform for a sophisticated air-to-air radar and missile system. This aircraft would loiter for hours at low speed and high altitude, ready to protect a group of ships from Soviet bombers with air-to-surface missiles, a growing threat. Mission requirements were so limited that the Navy first planned for only a subsonic aircraft, though this was changed to supersonic-capable to add versatility. The Navy envisioned a medium-sized carrier-based aircraft, about 55,000 lbs takeoff weight--slightly larger than the new F-4 Phantom. (10:136-137)

 

At the same time, the Air Force was also looking for a new tactical aircraft. In the mind of Gen. F. F. Everest, head of the Tactical Air Command (TAC), the aircraft would be able to fly supersonic at low altitude and fly at low speed at high altitude. It would cross the Atlantic non-stop and be able to operate from short, unimproved airfields expected in Europe during a war. Primary mission would be delivery of air-to-ground ordnance. The Air Force expected such an aircraft to be relatively large, with a takeoff weight over 75,000 1bs.(10:135, 137)

 

These disparate concepts were progressing separately as the administration of President Eisenhower ended. Secretary of Defense Tom Gates, however, did not want to commit the coming Kennedy administration to two major projects, so he essentially put them on hold in 1960.(10:136) When Robert McNamara became Secretary of Defense in 1961, he "took charge" of the department, developing a list of 131 tasks. Among the 112 completed that first year was the decision to build a new aircraft for both the Navy and Air Force--a program known as TFX, for "tactical fighter, experimental," which became the F-111.(10:22) 

 

McNamara was confident that one airplane could meet the requirements of all four services, though this expectation was later reduced to just the Air Force and Navy. Advances in engines and aerodynamics, especially the variable-geometry wing, made possible the required range of performance.(10:25) In a memorandum written 1 September 1961, the Secretary of Defense called for "a single aircraft for both the Air Force tactical mission and the Navy FAD mission," to be developed primarily by the Air Force, with changes as required by the Navy held to a minimum.(10:137)

 

Cost was one of the major concerns with the program. The F-111 was expected to cost over $3 million a copy at a time when most tactical aircraft cost $1 million to $2 million each. McNamara justified this by claiming that using a single airplane for both services would result in overall savings of $1 billion.(3:308, 10:148) Another source claimed that the high unit cost would be partially offset by the plane's impressive range, which would essentially reduce the need for much of the Air Force tanker fleet. The billion-dollar savings McNamara promised assumed there would be a high degree of commonality between Air Force and Navy versions of the plane, and "commonality' was to become another sticking point with TFX. The idea was attractive, with an expected 84% commonality between versions.(1:26)

 

Flight performance goals were ambitious, as illustrated by aircraft speed: the new aircraft was to have a top speed of Mach 2.5 (over 1,500 knots), and be able to fly as slow as 80 knots for landing, especially important for aircraft carrier operations.(1:26) While high speed capability is justifiable in an air-to-air fighter, Mach 2.5 seems an arbitrary challenge to F-111 engineers: later fighters that have been perfectly acceptable did not have this top speed. The 80 knot landing speed can be similarly criticized--the Navy's F-14 and FA-18 fighters make do with landing speeds in the 130-knot range. This indicates a relatively simplistic view of fighter performance in the early 1960s, when "speed" predominated over wing loading, turn rate, and other more valuable criteria. 

 

Challenging as it was, the F-111 contract promised to be rewarding: the Air Force planned to buy 1,400 aircraft, and the Navy was looking at a force of 300.(10:141) Six aerospace companies submitted proposals. Those from Boeing and General Dynamics appeared most promising, and on 24 November 1962 the latter was announced as the contract winner.(10:138) General Dynamics had selected Grumman Aerospace as its principle subcontractor, to assist with development of the Navy version and to build portions of all F-111s. 

      

Selection of General Dynamics shocked military planners who had been working on TFX and expected Boeing to win. The outcry was so great that investigative hearings were begun in February 1963 by Senator John McClellan, chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Sen. McClellan expected the investigation to last "five or six hearing days."(10:142)

 

Service preferences were established early. A senior Navy representative, ADM Frederick Ashworth, testified that the Navy had a strong preference for the Boeing design, citing four areas: 

      - lower gross weight, 

      - better subsonic flight characteristics, 

      - better performance ratings on Navy combat missions, and 

      - lower price. 

Air Force Chief of Staff GEN Curtis LeMay reiterated this preference, reporting that "200 experts" had worked nearly a year comparing the two designs, and Boeing had won.(3:305, 307)

 

Against such remarks, the subcommittee found just one document supporting the choice of General Dynamics: a five-page memorandum of justification signed by Secretary McNamara, along with the secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, three days before the award announcement. Investigators said the memorandum was loaded with errors.(3:300)

 

The McClellan hearings lasted through summer and into the fall of 1963. One source after another reported on the merits of the Boeing proposal compared to that from General Dynamics. McNamara defended his decision in the press and before Congress on principles such as commonality and growth potential, instead of with the cold analysis for which he was famous. Eventually, it seemed the decision was influenced by two long-time McNamara associates: Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and Secretary of the Navy Frederick Korth. Both men had business connections with General Dynamics and personal interests in its fortunes. As this information was being developed before the McClellan hearings, President Kennedy was assassinated. The profound sense of loss experienced by the nation "made it impossible to continue the hearings."(3:313-321) General Dynamics and Grumman proceeded with the F-111. 

      

Shortly after the inconclusive end of the McClellan hearings, Navy again expressed dissatisfaction with the F-111. Navy Secretary Korth was replaced in November 1963 by Paul Nitze, who asked for an update on the plane. The briefing was "pessimistic," according to a March 1964 press report that said the Navy was "alarmed" by increases in weight and aerodynamic drag compared to earlier estimates. Air Force officers expressed similar concerns. The report noted, however, that such sentiments were held by lower-ranking personnel in marked contrast to the glowing public statements of senior officials. (11:16)

 

Additionally, McNamara's billion-dollar savings claim was disputed by the Defense Department engineer who had performed the arithmetic, Albert Blackburn, who said the number was a "rough estimate" made before contractors had even submitted bids.(11:16)

 

These and other hurdles failed to stop the project, and the Air Force F-111A was rolled out at General Dynamics, Ft. Worth, on 15 October 1964. On this occasion, Navy Secretary Nitze joined Air Force leaders in praising the beleaguered aircraft: 

      The Navy is firmly committed to the success of this program .... (The F-111B) will give us the finest weapons system ever produced for the achievement of air superiority.(10:134)

 

On 11 May 1965, the Navy F-111B was publicly unveiled at Grumman Aerospace on Long Island. In his remarks, Secretary Nitze mentioned the F-111B's ability to perform the FAD mission as well as escort attack aircraft and even perform the attack mission itself (9:46)--capabilities that were not apparent in earlier descriptions of the fighter. Specifications of the two versions of the aircraft are shown for comparison in Table 1.       

     
 

The F-111B made its first flight only seven days after rollout, on 18 May 1965. Operationally it was a success. Unfortunately, the occasion revealed just how much the aircraft had grown, for gross weight was about 77,000 lbs.(9:46) Navy had hoped for a 55,000-lb aircraft, then revised this to a reasonable 63,000 lbs.(11:16) With an eventual weight near 80,000 lbs, the F-111B would certainly require special handling on aircraft carriers, where the heaviest aircraft weighed about 70,000 lbs (the A-3 and RA-5). More important, high gross weight would adversely affect flight capabilities critical to a fighter--maneuverability, speed, climb rate, and others--whether it was intended to perform the FAD mission, or more realistically take on other roles.(12:35)

 

Besides being overweight, the F-111B experienced an increase in aerodynamic drag, 2 to 3% higher than expected, according to the Navy. The response was to modify the fuselage and canopy designs.(11:16) This may not sound drastic, but is indicative of the difficulties encountered as the program progressed. Greater weight and drag also meant a different on-speed attitude during carrier landings. This required a different ejectable crew module to function properly, which reduced commonality further. One of the attractions of the F-111 program had been the 84% commonality between Air Force and Navy versions, but as development continued commonality fell to "a nominal 29%." (9:55-56)

 

These developments also resulted in attachment to the Navy model of a nickname inappropriate for any fighter: Seapig.(9:47)

 

Through these troubles, Grumman, with a reputation for solid carrier-based planes, portrayed itself as "merely a subcontractor which cannot speak out."(11:16) General Dynamics bore the brunt of the heat. 

      

The centerpiece of the Navy's F-111 was its AWG-9 radar and weapons system operating in conjunction with the AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile. Both were made by Hughes Aircraft and designed for the FAD mission. The AWG-9 could track 24 targets and control six Phoenix missiles to attacks on different targets simultaneously. This was unprecedented capability, perfect for the defense of ships from a raid by enemy bombers. With two Phoenix in the internal weapons bay and two under each wing, the F-111B's load of six missiles was also impressive for the time.(9:47-51)

 

The first Phoenix launch came in April 1966, over the Pacific. In May, the Phoenix scored its first actual target intercept. These shots and most AWG-9/Phoenix testing used an A-3 bomber modified to carry the radar, which provided room for instrumentation and technicians as well as plenty of fuel for long test flights. The test program included only a few instances of F-111Bs carrying and launching AIM-54 missiles.(9:47, note)

 

While the AWG-9/AIM-54 combination was impressive, the B model could carry no other air-to-air weapons. This would have greatly limited its effectiveness in operation, where a variety of missiles and a gun have been found necessary. It was to be capable of employing bombs, rockets, and short-range air-to-surface missiles--some evidence that the Navy realized the narrow utility of a FAD-only fighter.(9:55) But, like the speed specifications, this indicates a shallow understanding of realistic air combat requirements. 

      

Grumman was under contract for nine pre-production F-111Bs. The second one flew in October 1965, and by early 1967 five "Seapigs" were engaged in different aspects of flight test, weapons test, and carrier operations trials.

 

During the same period, technologically-impressive fighters flown by both Navy and Air Force pilots were being embarrassed in actual combat in Vietnam. High speed and long-range missiles were not always enough against light and maneuverable MiGs flown by clever pilots. Top speed and a great radar were important for some missions, but other important attributes became apparent: maneuverability, a versatile weapons load, and aircrew visibility, to name a few. The F-111B possessed none of these. The Air Force could still use its F-111s for the strike mission, but the Navy needed something else for its next fighter.

 

Many of the F-111B's limitations could be traced to a specific condition--high gross weight. In response, Grumman made major efforts to correct the problem: the "Super Weight Improvement Program" was followed by a series of "Colossal Weight Improvement Programs" (CWIP). These proved simply inadequate; takeoff weight was up to 79,000 lbs. and CWIP would cut only 4,000.(9:47, 56)

 

A crash during takeoff in April 1967 resulted in the deaths of both crewmen and heightened congressional attention, which led to a six-month delay in the Navy program. This time allowed for reconsideration by Congress and formulation of a gameplan by the Navy.(9:56)

 

The Navy's senior leadership began speaking out against the aircraft, in contrast to its earlier practice of promising that any problems could be fixed. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) ADM Thomas Moorer led the effort, meeting repeatedly with Secretary McNamara in attempts to get the F-111B canceled, by highlighting the F-111B's drag and acceleration problems.(6:20)

 

Congress was again concerned with the F-111 as the profound nature of its limitations became apparent. ADM Moorer was joined by Deputy CNO for Air Warfare ADM Tom Conolly before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1968. Conolly summed-up the Navy's feelings about the whole program when discussing a proposed fix for another F-111B problem: "There isn't enough power in all Christendom to make that airplane what we want!" (8:21)

 

Meanwhile, the F-111B became more expensive. The original cost estimate was in the then-shocking neighborhood of $3 million apiece. Later, production F-111Bs were expected to cost $9-10 million each.(3:322)

 

McNamara completed his tenure as Secretary of Defense in March 1968. Coupled with the Navy's well-defined and emphatic position on the matter, this allowed Congress to finally cancel the F-111B. Although carrier operations were conducted in May 1968 they only reiterated the obvious. Both houses of Congress eliminated funds for the program that summer. Contractors were formally notified of program cancellation on 9 July 1968.(9:56)

 

Seven F-111Bs were delivered to the Navy, the other two preproduction aircraft being canceled before they were completed. Although procurement was canceled, flight tests continued through 1971 to perfect the AWG-9 radar and Phoenix missile. Two more crashes claimed two more lives, and the four surviving airframes were disabled or scrapped when testing was complete.(9:56) 

      

While the F-111B was revealing its unsuitability for fleet use, the Soviet Union was displaying an impressive group of aircraft. At the 1967 Domodedovo air show, the West saw a new generation of Soviet aircraft publicly displayed. Capable of outperforming the F-4, these aircraft had been predicted for several years by intelligence analysts. They brought the F-111B's deficiencies as a fighter into focus.(5:22)

 

Grumman realized that the Navy genuinely needed a new fighter, and a design team under Mike Pelehach began laying out an aircraft using worthwhile components of the F-111B. The team saved the weapons system, but added the ability to control missiles other than Phoenix. They retained the variable-geometry wing concept to provide a wide range of operating speed. The afterburning turbofan engines were also carried-over; these offered both fuel efficiency and high thrust.(7:8-9)

 

Far beyond patching components together, Grumman's team designed a new aircraft that would meet every definition of the word "fighter." Though the new aircraft had swing wings, they were redesigned for maneuverability. The fuselage was innovative: 40% of the aerodynamic lift is produced by a large flat channel between the engine nacelles. Grumman also deleted the internal weapons bay, since it increased aircraft size but would not be of use in all missions. Grumman offered this proposal to the Navy in October 1967, before the F-111B was even canceled but after its limitations had become apparent.

 

This aircraft would be able to perform the FAD mission and defeat bombers, but Grumman also said it would defeat any fighter the Soviet Union was expected to develop for the next 30 years. Thus, the fighter needed by the Navy was possible. In July 1968, as the F-111B was killed by Congress, the Navy accepted the new concept, calling it "VFX," a standard Navy designation for a developmental fighter design. Although Grumman had presented the concept, by procurement rules Navy requested designs from all interested companies. Five companies submitted proposals, but Grumman was selected in January 1969. VFX was to become the F-14 Tomcat.(7:5-9)

 

The F-14 first flew in December 1970, two-and-a-half years after cancellation of the F-111B. F-14 specifications are in every instance improvements over those of the F-111B (Table 2), but this came at a cost. In 1974, an F-14 cost $11.3 million and Grumman lost money at this price.(2:66) Later, the cost per aircraft would reach $40 million, but the F-14 proved itself in exercises and in combat, and $40 million became accepted as the price paid for a superior aircraft. 

 

        

The F-111 has become a capable, important part of the U. S. Air Force. (The Royal Australian Air Force also operates a small fleet of F-111s.) Production, however, fell short of the original prediction, and the final total was 560 F-111s of all types.(9:183)

 

One author states that "individuals thoroughly familiar with (McNamara's) views are certain" he believed the F-111 program should not have been conducted as it was.(10:152) Both services needed new aircraft, and commonality is a valid concept, but the TFX requirement was too broad to be achieved by a single plane.

 

More than thirty years after McNamara announced the F-111, the Navy and Air Force are again considering a common aircraft. Several aircraft have been used by both--the F-4 and A-7, for example--but they were not planned from the beginning as such. Air Force Secretary Donald Rice in January 1993 said it was feasible to develop a carrier-capable multi-role fighter and later modify it for land-based operations "if you set that (carrier capability) down as a criterion up front."(4:55)

 

So the services have not overreacted to their unpleasant experience with the F-111, and will seek economy through commonality when possible. But it will be many years before people think "F-111" without also thinking "controversial." 

1. "Assembling of TFX Subcontractors Begins." Author unlisted. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 3 December 1962, pp. 26-27. 

2. Gervasi, Tom. Arsenal of Democracy. New York, NY: Grove Press, Inc., 1977. 

3. Mollenhoff, Clark R. The Pentagon; Politics, Profit and Plunder. New York, NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1967. 

4. Morocco, John D. "Rice Sees Multirole Fighter as Joint Air Force/Navy Project." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 February 1993, p. 55. 

5. "Navy Evaluates F-111B Substitutes." Author unlisted. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 29 January 1968, pp. 22-23. 

6. "Navy Seen Abandoning F-111B Purchases." Author unlisted. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 22 January 1968, p. 20. 

7. Reed, Arthur. F-14 Tomcat. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978. 

8. "Tests and Testimony. " Author un1isted. Time, 22 March 1968, p. 21. 

9. Thornborough, Anthony M., and Peter E. Davies. F-111; Success in Action. London, Great Britain: Arms and Armour Press, Ltd., 1989. 

10. Trewhitt, Henry L. McNamara. New York, NY: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1971. 

11. Wilson, George C. "F-111 Weight, Drag Increases Alarm Navy." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 23 March 1964, pp. 16-17. 

12. Wilson, George C. "Navy F-111 Rolled Out; Fleet Use to be Determined in Flight Test." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 17 May 1965, p. 35.